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HOWE (1835), DIXON (1920) AND MCLACHLAN 
(1923): COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF SEDITION
Barry Cahill’
“Then there is Howe, who was prosecuted by the corrupt magistrates whom he 
exposed in his day. By the way, he successfully defended himself, and I hope to 
perhaps follow his glorious example. He is now proclaimed as Nova Scotia’s 
noblest son.”
— FJ. Dixon, 1920
“When they tried Joseph Howe for sedition, they erected a monument to him in 
the shadow of the County jail [ric: Province House yard].”
— J.B. McLachlan, 1924
“I am not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, but I tell you that what happened 
to Howe will happen to McLachlan.”
— J.S. Woodsworth, 1924
In Halifax, in 1835, Joseph Howe, a newspaper proprietor and editor, was tried for 
seditious libel for publishing the second of two pseudonymous letters critical of 
local government. In Winnipeg, in 1920, F J . (Fred) Dixon, an independent labour 
member of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, was tried for seditious libel for 
publishing in the strike bulletin which he briefly edited during the General Strike 
of 1919, articles critical of the strike’s suppression. In Halifax, in 1923, J.B. 
McLachlan, communist secretary of United Mine Workers of America District 26, 
was tried for seditious libel for having written an official letter critical of the 
violent actions of the provincial police in Sydney. These three “state trials” 
document the important historical conflicts out of which they arose, reflect the 
politico-legal contexts in which they occurred and illustrate the meaning of the 
“misrule of law” as it developed through the repressive exercise of state power 
during both the colonial and the national periods. This article is an attempt at a
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comparative legal historiography of sedition trials, which were fairly regular 
occurrences in colonial times and during the “Red scare” of the inter-war period.1
In a seminal article published in 1974, Kenneth McNaught described R. v 
Howe and R. v Dixon as Canada’s “two most significant cases involving political 
freedom of the press.”2 The link between R. v. Howe and R. v. Dixon, and 
between Howe and McLachlan, is well established in scholarship, while the link 
between Dixon and McLachlan — by far the most obvious — has yet to be forged. 
Though David Frank, in his important sixtieth-anniversary article about 
McLachlan’s 1923 trial for seditious libel, alludes to the seditious libel charge 
against J.S. Woodsworth,3 he says nothing about the 1920 trial of Fred Dixon on 
the same charge. Paul MacEwan, in his study of labour in Cape Breton, also 
ignores Dixon4 and John Mellor’s sole reference to Dixon, throughout the whole 
of his lengthy popular biography of McLachlan, is an unsourced quotation from 
the Western Labor News Strike Bulletin.5
McNaught, for his part, avoids drawing any comparison between Dixon and 
McLachlan, despite the fact that they were strike leaders charged with the same 
crime and for much the same reasons. Furthermore, both Dixon and Howe are 
discussed in the context of freedom of the press, not seditious libel, while the 
“case of J.B. McLachlan shows how the definition of seditious libel was ... 
broadened,”6 so that even the restricted circulation (among District locals) of a 
privileged official communication could in law be deemed a publication.
As Howe, Dixon and McLachlan will all be treated in due course in the Canadian State Trials Series,
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from The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. For Howe see infra note 57; Dixon is 
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Michael Earle’s critical historiographical study of J.B. McLachlan’s legacy, 
published in the special issue of New Maritimes commemorating the fiftieth 
anniversary of McLachlan’s death in 1937,7 shows that the “myth” of the 
working-class anti-hero can be “manipulated” by misrepresenting those aspects of 
the “legacy” which tend to reclaim the radical political character of labour’s history 
of resistance. The same holds true for the attempt to reclaim the legal context 
and character of this history. Indeed, not until the pioneering work of C.B. Wade 
in 19508 and, much later, of Paul MacEwan and McLachlan’s biographer, David 
Frank, was sustained attention paid to the criminal justice aspects of capital’s war 
against labour.
The same is true of the most famous strike in Canadian history. “Until very 
recently,” writes J.M. Bumsted in his seventy-fifth anniversary narrative, “the 
post-strike sedition trials of the arrested strike leaders were a relatively unexplored 
dimension of the Winnipeg General Strike.”9 The sedition trials of the leaders 
of the Winnipeg General Strike were a significant escalation in the capitalist state’s 
assault on organized labour. Ten years earlier, sedition law was not only different 
but, as a rule, it was not applied in the realm of “industrial illegality”. In 
September 1909, for example, during the strike by Nova Scotia coalminers for 
recognition of the UMWA, District 26 president, Dan MacDougall, was arrested 
and charged with defamatory libel for having published a statement critical of the 
Dominion Coal Company’s operations in industrial Cape Breton, in La Patrie 
(Montreal). Though the Crown entered a nolle prosequi and MacDougall was
7M. Earle, “The Legacy; Manipulating the Myth of McLachlan” in I. McKay and S. Milsom, eds., 
Toward a New Maritimes: A Selection from Ten Years of New Maritimes (Charlottetown: Ragweed 
Press, 1992) at 84. Reprinted from Issue Number 55 of New Maritimes, 6:4/5, Dec. 1987 - Jan. 1988, 
which was “A Special Commemorative Issue” subtitled “J.B. McLachlan : The Trial; The Image; The 
Legacy,” on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of McLachlan’s death (3 November 1937). The 
first part was D. Frank, “The Trial: The King v. J.B. McLachlan” at 3.
8C.B. Wade, “History of District 26, United Mine Workers of America, 1919-1941” [ca. 1950], 
typescript, 299; see [Chapter 4], “1923: Steel - Coal Strike,” passim. In the autumn of 1944, Claude 
Bates Wade, a chartered accountant and formerly tutor in accounting at Queen’s University, was 
engaged as director of research and education for District 26 of the UMWA: MacEwan, supra note 
4 at 267, 283. The draft of Wade’s unfinished official history, suspected of being unseasonably 
left-wing at a time when anti-communist paranoid hysteria far exceeded anything seen in 1919-24, is 
thought to have led to Wade’s summary dismissal from his post in 1950. (I am grateful to Paul 
Banfield, Associate University Archivist, Queen’s University, Byron Wall [son-in-law] and Maureen 
Williams, Curator, Special Collections, St Francis Xavier University Library, for sharing with me 
information concerning the late C.B. Wade.)
9J.M. Bumsted, The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919: An Illustrated History (Winnipeg: Watson & 
Dwyer, 1994) at 65.
never tried, ten years later he would likely have been charged with sedition rather 
than defamation.10
The year 1919, when District 26 of the UMWA was re-constituted after having 
been dissolved in 1915, witnessed what Gregory Kealey called “the Canadian 
labour revolt”11 against labour’s repression by a coercive state acting in the 
interests of corporate finance capitalism. The identification of corporate interest 
with public interest — big business with government — meant that industrial action 
would thereafter be viewed from within the criminal justice context as virtual crime 
against the state. The legality of resistance to employer hegemony became harder 
to contest when the machinery for administering criminal justice — especially the 
public prosecution service — was systematically applied by government to limit or 
defeat the workers’ right to organize.
David Frank and Don MacGillivray characterize the trial of J.B. McLachlan 
for seditious libel as a watershed which transformed industrial relations,12 leading 
in the short term to the criminalization of industrial action for bargaining-unit 
recognition, and in the long term to a bridge “across the great divide separating 
the era of ‘labour’s war’ from the age of ‘industrial legality’.”13 In order to 
reclaim McLachlan for legal history in general, and state trials historiography in 
particular, it is necessary to recontextualize McLachlan’s 1923 trial for seditious 
libel in relation to both Dixon and Howe. Howe, Dixon and McLachlan were all 
tried for the same crime — seditious libel — which was even more solidly 
entrenched in Canada’s Criminal Code as a result of rigorous post-Winnipeg 
General Strike enhancements,14 than it had been in English common law for the 
two centuries preceding 1892, when the Criminal Code was enacted. Yet 
traditional state trials historiography, represented by McNaught, misconstrues
“General Summary” Labour Gazette [Ottawa] 10 (1909) at 533; Mellor, supra note 5 at 62-5; 
MacEwan, supra note 4 at 35. MacDougall had not published anything criticizing the government 
directly or even by implication — unlike Joseph Howe, who is nevertheless assumed to have been 
charged with criminal defamation rather than sedition.
UG.S. Kealey, “1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt” (1984) 13 Labour/Le Travail 11; see infra note 
59.
12D. Fraser, Echoes from Labor’s Wars : The Expanded Edition : Industrial Cape Breton in the 1920s 
: Echoes of World War One : Autobiography & Other Writings, D. Frank & D. MacGillivray, eds. 
(Wreck Cove N.S.: Breton Books, 1992) at xvi.
13Supra note 3 at 225. For a trenchant neo-Marxist critique of the industrial relations system as 
lowering working-class consciousness and strait-jacketing political radicalism, see M. Earle and I. 
McKay, “Introduction: Industrial Legality in Nova Scotia” in M. Earle, ed., Workers and the State in 
Twentieth Century Nova Scotia (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1989) at 9 et seq.
14The Criminal Code Amendment Act, S.C. 1919, c. 46 — was passed within days of the end of the 
Winnipeg General Strike and came into force on 1 October 1919. It raised the maximum sentence
on conviction for seditious libel from two to twenty years’ imprisonment. (The punishment for 
seditious offences was again reduced to two years maximum in 1930.)
McLachlan by supposing that the Criminal Code Amendment Act 1919 “was to 
prove convenient in obtaining convictions, amongst others, of J.B. McLachlan for 
his role in the extended industrial conflict in Nova Scotia in the early 1920s. 
The amendment, though pertinent, was not brought to bear on the charge as laid 
against McLachlan or on the sentence imposed after his conviction.
Ironically, the industrial action which led to the prosecution of McLachlan did 
not originate with the Cape Breton coalminers. In June 1923, Sydney steelworkers 
struck again for recognition of their union. When mounted provincial police, who 
had been summoned at the behest of the British Empire Steel Corporation 
(Besco), made a bloody charge against the Sunday evening crowd on Victoria 
Road in Sydney on July 1, McLachlan, in his capacity as secretary of District 26, 
authorized a wildcat strike. “This was a fateful decision,” writes David Frank, 
quoting McLachlan’s official letter (sea Appendix 1),
one that brought down the wrath first of the provincial government and then of 
the international union. For his call to arms McLachlan was charged with 
seditious libel and subsequently sentenced to two years in jail. For his violation 
of international union polity in calling the sympathetic strike he was removed from 
office by John L. Lewis [president] of the United Mine Workers.16
McLachlan was prosecuted because he was the leader of an illegal sympathetic 
strike. The seditious libel for which he was convicted was an official letter signed 
and ordered circulated by McLachlan in his capacity as secretary of District 26 of 
the UMWA. McLachlan did not authorize publication of the letter which was 
undertaken without his knowledge or permission.17
^Supra note 2 at 161.
1<SD. Frank, “The 1920s: Class and Region, Resistance and Accommodation” in E.R. Forbes and D A  
Muise, eds., The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 233 
at 246-7.
17See infra Appendix 1. The District official letter was not, contrary to both Paul MacEwan’s and 
John Mellor’s assertion, published in the Maritime Labor Herald [Glace Bay]. Interestingly enough, 
McLachlan was not charged with publication in the pro-company, pro-government newspapers, the 
Post and the Record [both Sydney], where the alleged seditious libel appeared the same day as in the 
Morning Chronicle [Halifax]. Had this occurred, it would have been difficult to justify the 
Attomey-General’s decision not to have McLachlan tried in Sydney, where the Supreme Court sat for 
criminal proceedings but where O’Heam feared a knowledgeable grand jury would throw out the 
indictment. “Cape Breton County, with a population composed so largely of men, women and 
children affected by the [coalminers’] strike,” stated the Attorney-General in Assembly debate several 
months later, “was not the best place to hold the trial from the standpoint of the administration of 
criminal justice”: infra note 55. The full extent of the press conspiracy was not known until long after 
McLachlan’s trial: “The correspondent for the Associated Press at Sydney was a reporter for the 
Sydney Record, and that paper... was generally understood to be owned by the [British Empire Steel] 
corporation”: Halifax Herald (19 Feb. 1924) 9 (Assembly debates).
Ironically, the trial of J.B. McLachlan for seditious libel in 1923 has less in 
common with the trial of Fred Dixon for seditious libel in 1920 than Dixon does 
with Howe.18 Howe and Dixon were magnificent, single-handed acquittals, while 
Attorney-General Walter JA. O’Hearn — an able and experienced criminal lawyer
— personally prosecuted McLachlan and obtained a conviction. The chief 
difference between Howe and Dixon on one hand, and McLachlan on the other, 
was that McLachlan was neither editor of nor in any way connected with the 
newspapers in which the alleged seditious libel was published. Yet, because the 
government’s true aim was not to suppress sedition but to repress working-class 
political radicalism, there was never any question of the Crown’s proceeding 
against anyone other than the author and authorized distributor.
The parallels to Howe rest with Fred Dixon, who was acquitted after 
defending himself in a great forensic address purposely modelled on Howe’s. 
McLachlan, on the other hand, was dissuaded from defending himself, did not 
testify on his own behalf and was perfunctorily convicted. “[C]ivil libertarians, 
then and since,” according to Howe’s biographer, Murray Beck, “have excoriated 
the [McLachlan] trial for its alleged unfairness.”19 Yet, Beck too refuses to 
acknowledge any parallels between Howe and McLachlan. He forbears describing 
Howe as “seditious libel,” a technical term he uses in relation to McLachlan, and 
does not confront the suspicion that chief counsel for the defence, Gordon Sidney 
Harrington K.C., (in David Frank’s words) “deliberately exploited the case to 
promote the fortunes of the Conservative Party and prove the iniquity of the 
Liberal government.”20 Beck also fails to identify “McLachlan’s lawyers” as two 
politically ambitious Conservative barristers — the other was Halifax labour lawyer, 
John Archibald Walker — both of whom were elected to the Assembly in the 
Conservative sweep of 1925 and appointed to the cabinet. Harrington, a former 
mayor of Glace Bay, which was also home town to McLachlan and headquarters 
of District 26 of the UMWA, was counsel to the union.21
18R. St.G. Stubbs, Prairie Portraits (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1954) 85 at 108 presents the 
clearest statement of Dixon’s dependence on Howe. (This study was written by the son of the “radical 
lawyer,” Lewis St. George Stubbs, who had offered to defend Dixon.) As both Joseph Howe and Fred 
Dixon were charged with seditious libel, the similarities between the two cases are more numerous 
and striking than McNaught realizes; Howe too “had achieved political literacy from the bottom up”: 
supra note 2, toc. cit.
19J.M. Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia : Volume Two : Murray-Buchanan 1896-1988 (Tantallon N.S.: Four 
East Publications, 1988) at 97.
20D. Frank, “The Trial: The King vs. J.B. McLachlan” New Maritimes, supra note 7 at 7.
21Beck, supra note 19 at 100,115; Frank, supra note 7 at 7. Harrington’s watching brief as UMWA 
District counsel brought him to Halifax to supersede John A. Walker, who originally held the brief 
and who was afterwards retained as Harrington’s junior.
McLachlan — unlike Howe and Dixon — was a gross miscarriage of justice, in 
which the accused was “framed”, charged, tried, convicted and imprisoned for 
having published a seditious libel when in neither the legal nor the ordinary sense 
of the word had he published anything at all. Before the “fixed” publication, the 
Crown did not have even a prima facie case against the accused. The obvious 
motive for the government’s conniving at newspaper publication was not only to 
lay the basis for the charge of seditious libel, but also to give some reason for 
McLachlan’s incarceration and transportation to Halifax, which Attorney-General 
O’Hearn was later to characterize as “a neutral [safe?] county.” The very 
possibility of contesting the legal repression -  by achieving a counter-hegemonic 
success à la Howe and Dixon — was precluded by the careful manner in which the 
government stage-managed the proceedings against McLachlan from beginning to 
end.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the McLachlan prosecution was the 
result of a conspiracy involving the Red-baiting provincial Liberal government, the 
management of Besco and the proprietor of the Morning Chronicle — the only 
Halifax newspaper in which McLachlan’s official letter was published. The District 
circular appeared verbatim on the front page of the edition of 6 July 1923 —• a 
mere two days after it was issued — under the incendiary sub-headline, 
“McLachlan’s War Whoop.” Publication in Halifax had been arranged by Andrew 
Merkel, Maritime superintendent of The Canadian Press, whose vice-president, 
George Frederick Pearson, was also hereditary president of the Chronicle 
Publishing Company Limited. A lawyer and highly influential political insider — 
Beck describes him as “long a mastermind of the Liberal Party” — G. Fred 
Pearson was also Besco’s solicitor.22
Though McLachlan’s conviction for publication in Halifax was eventually struck 
down on appeal, at the time of the trial even the strongest legal defence would 
have been ineffectual against a government partial to Besco, a mass-circulation 
morning newspaper complicitously toeing the government’s line,  ^ an 
“anti-Bolshevik” Attorney-General prosecuting in person, a manipulable jury 
altogether unacquainted with labour-management relations in industrial Cape 
Breton, and an highly interested judge. Presiding over McLachlan was Justice 
Humphrey Mellish, a corporate lawyer and former solicitor for the Dominion Coal 
Company — who was elevated to the bench in 1918, so that he could more 
effectively protect the interests of his former corporate clients. The fact that 
Mellish’s law firm, Mclnnes Jenks Lovett & Macdonald [now Mclnnes Cooper &
“ On the [Halifax] Chronicle's “corporationism” and working-class radicalism as a political football 
kicked back and forth between the Liberal Chronicle and the Conservative Herald, see W.D. March, 
Red Une: The Chronicle-Herald and The Mail-Star 1875-1954 (Halifax; Chebucto Agencies, 1986) at 
208. Sfc alcf> Beck, supra note 19 at 92. It is worth noting that The Halifax Herald Limited purchased 
advertising in the Maritime Labor Herald (see, for example, issue of 30 June 1923).
Robertson], was in Besco’s pocket — the senior partner, Hector Mclnnes, was a 
director of the corporation — was sharply emphasized by J.S. Woodsworth MP in 
House of Commons debate in March 1924, following the announcement of the 
government’s decision to parole McLachlan.23 Woodsworth, who toured Nova 
Scotia in January 1924 at the invitation of the Nova Scotia Workers Defence 
Committee, enquired “concerning the judges of the supreme court, and... was told 
that the corporation influence on the bench was so strong that the court is looked 
upon by labour as a company department.”24 Charges of seditious libel against 
Woodsworth, a former editor of Winnipeg’s Strike Bulletin, were indefinitely stayed 
when Fred Dixon was acquitted of the same charge. Woodsworth read into 
Hansard the words uttered by Joseph Howe before the jury while introducing his 
discussion of The Libel Act 1792:
It is ninety years since in Nova Scotia a man was tried for sedition. Then a man 
was haled before the courts and accused of being “a wicked seditious and 
ill-disposed person, a person of most wicked and malicious temper and 
disposition.” That man is now regarded as one of Canada’s greatest sons, Joseph 
Howe. But he was able to say at that time, in connection with his trial:
“And here I may be permitted to thank heaven and our 
ancestors, that I do not stand before a corrupt and 
venal court and a packed and predetermined jury.’,2S
Joseph Howe’s trial for seditious libel, eighty-eight years before McLachlan’s, 
has never been excoriated for unfairness by civil libertarians or anyone else, 
because Howe was tried by an impartial, disinterested judge — Chief Justice 
Brenton Halliburton — and acquitted by an enlightened jury. Indeed the canonical, 
politico-biographical interpretation of Howe does not consider the possibility that 
this too was a trial for sedition, lest it be compared with the trial of the politically
House of Commons Debates (4 March 1924) at 64-5. The best, and most enlightening sketch of 
Justice Mellish is found in the official history of the downtown Halifax law firm of which he was a 
partner from 1907 to 1918: H. Flemming, Mclnnes Cooper & Robertson -A Century Plus (Halifax: s.n.,
1989) at 40-2. In addition to Mellish’s being “an outstanding corporationist on the bench” (per 
Woodsworth), the senior partner in his former law firm, Hector Mclnnes K.C. — a former 
Conservative MLA — was a director of Besco and, as senior Halifax director of the Bank of Nova 
Scotia, had been heavily involved in floating the Besco merger in 1920. See D. Frank, “The Cape 
Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British Empire Steel Corporation” in PA. Buckner 
and D. Frank, eds., The Acadiensis Reader: Volume Two = Atlantic Canada After Confederation, 2nd 
ed. (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1988) 204 at 221.
24House of Commons Debates (4 March 1924) at 64.
25Ibid.) quoting J-A. Chisholm, rev. & ed., The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe (Halifax: 
5.«., 1909) at 1:31, 36-7. Woodsworth was reprising a theme which he had developed during a speech 
at a mass meeting in Halifax on 13 January 1924, at the conclusion of his week-long, eight-town lecture 
tour, during which he appealed for the release of McLachlan and the six other working-class political 
prisoners: The [Halifax] Citizen (18 Jan. 1924) at 1 and 5; Maritime Labor Herald [Glace Bay] (19 Jan. 
1924) at 3 (text of Woodsworth’s Halifax speech).
persona non grata working-class radical, J.B. McLachlan. Repeated ad nauseam 
is the canard that Howe was tried for “criminal” libel, suggesting that the dual 
character of defamation as crime and tort could disprove the self-evident truth that 
Howe too was tried for seditious libel. Indeed the very success of Howe’s 
self-defence accounts for this misunderstanding of his trial, which resulted in an 
acquittal despite the fact that the truth of a libel was not pleadable except as a 
defence to an action, and that neither truth nor public benefit could be pleaded 
in justification of a seditious libel. McLachlan, unlike this secular Saint Joseph, 
was neither acquitted nor rewarded with post-trial electoral success.26 Howe’s 
unanticipated forensic triumph had the incidental effect of downgrading not only 
the seriousness of the charge against him, but also the profoundly legal, Erskinian 
character of his defence.
In many respects, of course, Howe and McLachlan were not on an equal 
footing. Unlike Howe, McLachlan had written and signed the letter and 
authorized its circulation; unlike Howe, he had not published it, and even if he 
had, the statutory civil defence of qualified privilege, set up by Nova Scotia’s Libel 
Act 190027 might have been pleadable. Private communications were privileged, 
and the restricted circulation of McLachlan’s official letter exclusively among the 
locals comprising District 26 did not amount to publication in the narrow legal 
sense. Unlike Howe, who was unsuccessfully prosecuted for having published the 
alleged libel, McLachlan was successfully prosecuted despite not having published 
it. Even if McLachlan’s counsel, Harrington, was correct in his view that sedition 
law was unaffected by the passage of the jury-enhancing Libel Act 1792, which 
ensured a verdict according to conscience, there still was not even a prima facie 
case against the accused. In 1923, as in 1835, it was publication which constituted 
the offence,28 and there was no evidence that McLachlan was involved in the 
publication of the official letter, not even as an accessory. As District 26 official 
historian C.B. Wade recognized in 1950, “McLachlan had actually committed no 
offen[ce;]... the circular was privileged if sent only to the members of the locals,
26McLachlan, the perennial also-ran, stood unsuccessfully as Labour candidate for Cape Breton South 
in the federal election of 1925, taking 20 per cent of the vote and trailing the Liberal — who lost 
heavily to the Conservative — by a mere 893 votes out of 17,760: Fifteenth General Election 1925 : 
Report of the Chief Electoral Officer (Ottawa, 1926) at 317-8. McLachlan’s opponents were both 
lawyers, one of whom — the Liberal, Lauchlin Daniel Currie — a future Attorney-General and Chief 
Justice of the province, was to act for ten years as solicitor of UMWA District 26. See D. Frank, 
“Working-Class Politics: The Election [Campaigns] of J.B. McLachlan, 1916-1935,” in K. Donovan, 
ed., The Island: New Perspectives on Cape Breton’s History, 1713 -1990 (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 
1990) 181 at 200-2, 217.
^R-S.N.S. 1923, c. 230; predecessor of the modem Defamation Act.
^This point was made by James F. Gray, Crown Attorney, opening for the Attorney-General in R. 
v. Howe: Chisholm, supra note 25 at 1:25.
as it actually was.”29 With no case for the defence to answer or the jury to 
consider, an impartial judge — which ex-Dominion Coal Company solicitor 
Humphrey Mellish palpably was not — would have been obliged to direct a verdict 
of acquittal.
Just as Howe has always been treated circumspectly — more in iconographie 
than in historical terms — so too has R. v. McLachlan. None of McLachlan*s 
students have drawn attention to the fact that “Red Dan” Livingstone, who was 
president of District 26 at the time of his and McLachlan’s arrest, though twice 
remanded, was never tried because he agreed to turn king’s evidence against 
McLachlan before the grand jury. The motive behind Livingstone’s volte-face is 
suggested by his being the only one of the Crown witnesses against McLachlan not 
to testify at the trial. Livingstone denounced McLachlan in return for an indefinite 
stay of proceedings, which lasted the remaining fourteen years of his life. Yet 
Livingstone, who had neither composed nor signed the official letter, was 
inculpated as an accessory before the fact. The only crime he had committed was 
the courtesy of informing the management of the Dominion Coal Company that 
the miners were being called out in response to the emergency at the Sydney 
steelworks.
Joseph Howe — it needs to be said — was neither arrested nor jailed, though 
he expected to be and arranged for bail to be posted by his friends, while 
McLachlan and Livingstone were not only arrested, transported to Halifax and 
imprisoned, but were initially denied bail at the instance of the Crown. Nor was 
Howe’s venue changed from Halifax to Sydney, to be tried by a jury of coalminers, 
who had as little understanding of abuses in the administration of local 
government in the District of Halifax as the jury of Halifax petit-bourgeois who 
convicted McLachlan had of labour relations in industrial Cape Breton. The 
Crown failed to make its case in Howe and Dixon and would have failed to do so 
in McLachlan had he too been tried by a jury of his peers. Howe — tried and 
acquitted by sympathetic friends and neighbours and readers of his reformist 
newspaper, the Novascotian — was thought by the Halifax bar, who to a man 
refused his retainer, to be foredoomed. Conversely, McLachlan’s lawyer, seeing 
in his client a latter-day Howe, was overconfident of victory. G.S. Harrington, who
^Wade, supra note 8. “The defences of absolute and qualified privilege appear to apply to a charge 
of seditious libel”: Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed. [reissue] (London: Butterworths, 1990) ll(i) 
at 78, para. 90. Wade further states, “The opinion of a very conservative-minded lawyer in Cape 
Breton who was familiar with the McLachlan case was obtained by the writer.” The unnamed source 
is almost certain to have been James William Maddin K.C. (1874-1961), who as a criminal counsel in 
Sydney was active defending coalminers charged with offences during the “Company Stores Raids” 
at New Aberdeen (within the town of Glace Bay) in 1922. Maddin, a prominent Cape Breton criminal 
lawyer and former Conservative MP, was one of three lawyers who filed affidavits on behalf of 
McLachlan, supporting Harrington’s unsuccessful application for a change of venue from Halifax to 
Sydney: PANS RG 39 ‘C  (HX) box 706 file B-164 (affidavit of James W. Maddin, 8 Sept. 1923).
had never practised in Halifax and was far from being the “noted barrister” of 
John Mellor’s rose-coloured romance, was facing one of the leading criminal 
counsel of the Halifax bar in Attorney-General O’Hearn. Harrington nevertheless 
aimed to achieve, without any help from his client, whom he did not call to testify 
in his own defence, what Howe and Dixon had achieved by unassisted 
advocateship. The upshot was that Howe immediately became a “folk hero,”30 
and ultimately a figure of Olympian myth. His trial became the defining moment 
in the political history of the province. Dixon was overwhelmingly re-elected to 
the Manitoba legislature in the general election held four months after his 
acquittal. McLachlan, however, remained a working-class anti-hero, whose trial 
and unsuccessful appeal, in David Frank’s words, “passed on into the untapped 
obscurity of legal history.”31
Scholars of Howe have failed to acknowledge the resemblance of the 
McLachlan sedition trial to the Howe sedition trial. They seem unaware that 
seditious libel at common law is sedition not libel, and that Howe was not on trial 
for defamation, but for a crime against the state. The politically and socially 
dangerous implication for the historiography is that Howe, the petit-bourgeois 
“conservative reformer,”32 would be coloured by association with McLachlan, the 
working-class radical and Bolshevik pariah. Yet, at the time of his own sedition 
trial Howe did not consider himself, nor did his friends or enemies consider him 
to be conservative in any sense of the word. That Howe stood four-square in the 
English radical whig tradition is clear from a close, impartial reading of the 
stenographic report of his courtroom address in his own defence.33 In that sense, 
J.B. McLachlan no less than Fred Dixon was a legatee of Joseph Howe, as well
^See, for example, the title of Chapter 5 of M. Byers and M. McBumey, Atlantic Hearth: Early Homes 
and Families of Nova Scotia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 37: “The Trial That 
Launched a Folk Hero.”
31Frank, supra note 3 at 222. Schmeiser, for example, argued that McLachlan did not contain “any
test of sedition”: D A  Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) 
205 at 207. In fact this was not so; the rule propounded in McLachlan, namely that publications other 
than the alleged libel were admissible for the purpose of establishing seditious intention, was simply 
not followed or applied in Boucher (1950), where the full bench of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
dividing five to four — and almost evenly along ethno-religious lines — overrode the existing case law 
“in favour of a test which is the most liberal ever adopted by a common law court”: ibid. 209; Boucher 
(1950), [1951] S.C.R. 265. McLachlan was not cited in Boucher, though there had not been any other 
successful prosecutions for seditious libel in the interim, while the liberal test adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Canada was articulated nearly forty years earlier in J. King, The Law of Criminal Libel 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1912) at xxiv [Addenda]. On Canadian case law generally see Crankshaw’s 
Criminal Code of Canada, 8th ed. G.P. Rodrigues, ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1979) fasc. 1, part ii at 31 
et seq.
3aThe epithet forms the subtitle of the first of Beck’s two-volume definitive biography, Joseph Howe: 
Volume I: Conservative Re former 1804-1848 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1982).
as the provider of a legacy of working-class political radicalism — and his 
forerunners were the radical reformers of a century earlier.
Excepting only McLachlan, the study of sedition in Nova Scotia has been 
obfuscated by the “criminal libel” misnomer such that the seditious libel 
prosecutions of William Wilkie in 1820 and Joseph Howe in 1835 are not seen for 
what they undoubtedly were: show trials staged by the ruling class to counter the 
perceived threat to the established order posed by ancillary crimes against the 
state.34 Just as Howe implicitly compared himself to the English radicals of the 
period of extreme Tory reaction in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries — many of whom were tried and convicted of seditious libel — so the 
comparison with Howe was advocated by McLachlan’s senior counsel, the 
Conservative lawyer-politician Harrington. If the radical pamphleteer William 
Wilkie — tried and convicted of seditious libel in 1820 after an unsuccessful 
self-defence conducted along the same lines as Howe’s fifteen years later — was 
a forerunner of Joseph Howe,35 then Howe was a forerunner of J.B. McLachlan, 
who assumes a place of honour within the century-old tradition of political protest 
and trials for sedition in Nova Scotia. McLachlan, writes David Frank, “was a 
political trial, part of a Canadian tradition we have found it all too easy to forget. 
These kinds of trials, such as Joseph Howe’s in 1835, had long pitted the forces 
of change against the forces of continuity.”36
Though in the last twenty years the trial of J.B. McLachlan for seditious libel 
has received closer scrutiny than the essentially seditionary character of the trial
^See, for example, McNaught (supra note 2 at 164-6), who assumes rather than argues that Howe was 
charged not with seditious libel but “with criminal [i.e., defamatory] libel (for clearly political 
purposes) ...” — a distinction having no basis either in Nova Scotian or in English law as it stood at 
the time of the Howe sedition trial. See, for example; The Criminal Libel Act 1819, which addressed 
“blasphemous and seditious Libels” [author’s italics] but not defamation. McNaught’s apparent 
purpose was to contrast Howe in this respect with Dixon, where the accused “was charged with 
seditious, rather than criminal libel”: McNaught, supra note 2 at 165. (Elsewhere in the same article, 
however, McNaught states that Howe and Dixon “each defended himself successfully against 
substantial charges of politically libellous publication” (at 156 n. 22) — a rather obvious 
circumlocution for seditious libel. Not even an unscholarly “goodread” biography of McLachlan, such 
as Mellor’s, shrinks from denominating Howe “seditious libel”: supra note 5 at 203, 223-4
3SThis thesis was first propounded by G.V.V. Nicholls, “A Forerunner of Joseph Howe” (1927) 8 Can. 
Hist. Rev. 224; cf. JA. Roy, Joseph Howe: A Study in Achievement and Frustration (Toronto: Macmillan 
Press, 1935) at 49-50. See now also B. Cahill, “Sedition in Nova Scotia: R. v. Wilkie (1820) and the 
Incontestable Illegality of Seditious Libel before R. v. Howe (1835)” (1994) 44 Dalhousie LJ. 458.
x Supra note 7 at 3. As long ago as 1912 John King identified three “State prosecutions for 
defamatory libel” in Upper Canada: Durand (1817), Collins (1828) and Mackenzie (1828): supra note 
31 at 71 et seqq. Chapter 4 of King’s 400-page treatise — the first, and still the only, Canadian text 
on the subject — deals with “Seditious Libels”, as do the “Addenda”. As the son-in-law of William 
Lyon Mackenzie — not to mention the father of the future prime minister — King was nothing if not 
well-placed to discuss sedition in Upper Canada.
of Joseph Howe was ever accorded, it remains unclear why McLachlan was 
charged with libel rather than conspiracy. The latter was easier to prove than the 
former, as the convictions of R.B. (“Bob”) Russell and six of the Winnipeg Seven
— not to mention the acquittal of Fred Dixon — made clear. The mystery deepens 
in view of the fact that the impetus behind the trial appears to have been the 
successful seditious conspiracy prosecutions arising from the Winnipeg General 
Strike, most notably R. v. Russell.
David Frank has rightly drawn attention to the dual aspect of 
Attorney-General O’Heam’s prosecutorial strategy, which embraced both the new 
Criminal Code offences relating to unlawful association and seditious literature, 
and the promising Russell precedent.37 Yet McLachlan was not charged under 
section 98 [formerly ss. 97A, 97B] of the Criminal Code, which greatly enlarged the 
scope of ancillary crimes against the state (“promoting changes by unlawful 
means’), nor was he charged with seditious conspiracy — though the same 
circumstantial exhibit evidence which helped convict Russell of conspiracy also 
helped convict McLachlan of libel. McLachlan was originally charged with the 
medieval and long-disused common-law misdemeanour of “spreading false news”
— then section 136 of the Code — which had to be changed to seditious libel, for 
the obvious reason that the “news” which McLachlan was allegedly “spreading” 
was not “false.”38 The Crown could not risk prosecuting McLachlan for an 
offence against which justification might be pleaded. Furthermore, the maximum 
sentence on conviction for spreading false news was one year, while that for 
seditious offences had been increased from two to twenty years by the Criminal 
Code Amendment Act 1919. Thus McLachlan was tried and convicted for seditious 
libel, the very charge on which Fred Dixon, who indeed published at his peril, was 
acquitted a mere three years before.
The key to this paradox lies in what David Frank has called the incoherence 
of McLachlan’s lawyers’ “line of defence in the course of the trial.”39 Because 
Howe and McLachlan were interconnected legally as well as historically, Howe 
could have been judicially considered in relation to McLachlan. By adducing 
Howe as a precedent, however, defence counsel impliedly conceded the most 
important part of the Crown’s weak and perfunctory case: that the accused had 
“published” an alleged seditious libel, just as Howe had done. The Crown was 
thus relieved of the burden of proving seditious intention and false defamation, 
which together constituted the offence with which McLachlan was charged. This
^Telegram, WJ. O’Heam to E.H. Armstrong, 20 May 1923: quoted in Frank, supra note 3 at 211.
38See the exordium to Dawn Fraser, “Hey, Jim [McLachlan] and Dan [Livingstone]”: supra note 12
at 38: “The ridiculous charge of ‘spreading false news’ was inspiring.”
line of defence, though perhaps misguidedly over-sanguine and ultimately 
ineffectual, can hardly be described as incoherent.
Defence counsel plainly did not believe that The Libel Act 1792 — “the first 
statute dealing with sedition” — which affirmed the jury’s broad fact-finding 
powers, applied to seditious libel, even though both Howe and Dixon relied upon 
it in their defence.40 Therefore, in order to constrain the jury to convict 
McLachlan, the Crown was at liberty to confine their attention to proving 
publication by the accused. It was as if The Libel Act 1792 did not exist or was not 
in force. The difference between Howe and McLachlan lies in the operation, not 
of the Criminal Code but of The Libel Act, which, according to McLachlan’s 
lawyers, had no application to sedition law. Even if The Libel Act did not exist, 
however, McLachlan might still not have been convicted. Though the fact-finding 
powers of the pre-1792 libel jury did not extend to seditious intention or ascriptive 
innuendo, the jury alone adjudged the fact of publication. McLachlan had not 
published the District 26 official letter; what he had written was not intended for 
publication, nor did he clandestinely arrange for its publication.41 He was neither 
the principal nor an accessory before the fact.
The roots of the Howe typology of McLachlan are to be found at the trial in 
Harrington’s defence of McLachlan. Unlike Howe, who could find no lawyer 
willing to defend him, McLachlan “was anxious to conduct his own defence,”42
See, for example, Dixon, supra note 5 at 9; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crimes against the 
state [Working Paper 49] (Ottawa: LRC, 1986) at 7. With the latter may be contrasted the view of 
G.S. Harrington and JA. Walker — counsel and solicitor, respectively, for the appellant — who 
argued during McLachlan v. R. (1924), 56 N.S.R. 413 at 417 (N.S.S.C. in Banco) that the “law in 
regard to seditious libel is as it was before the passage of Cox’s [sic: Fox’s] Libel Act”. The legal 
position in 1923 was not thought to be quite so forward as it had been in 1835, when the Crown 
attorney and the accused-defender in Howe agreed that The Libel Act, (1792) 32 Geo. 3 c. 60, settled 
the question that finding seditious intention was not for the judge but for the juiy. The effect of The 
Libel Act 1792 was to sharpen the distinction between law and fact, which had been blurred through 
the judicial “doctoring” of seditious libel, and to emphasize the defamatory over the seditionary 
aspects of the offence. The Canadian leading case on the reception of The Libel Act 1792 is R. v. 
Dougall (1874), 18 L.C. Jurist 85 at 87 and 89 (Que. B.R), per Ramsay J, who ruled that the act was 
in force everywhere because it was declaratory of the common law.
41According to English case-law, most of which antedated 1832, “If the manuscript of a seditious libel 
is proved to be in the handwriting of the accused, and it is also proved that the same libel was in fact 
published, this is prima facie evidence for the jury of a publication by the accused, though no evidence 
is adduced that he directed the publication”: Halsbury, supra note 29 at 79, para. 91. These are the 
very grounds on which McLachlan was convicted, and on which two out of the three counts of his 
conviction were upheld on appeal.
42McNaught, supra note 2 at 166. MacEwan, supra note 4 at 116. It is possible that McLachlan’s 
original intention was to emulate the triumphant acquittal of Fred Dixon, who had so recently and 
so spectacularly emulated the triumphant acquittal of Howe. McLachlan probably met Dixon in 
Winnipeg during his cross-country lecturing and fund-raising tour with Cape Breton County Labour 
MLA, Forman Waye; the pair spoke in Winnipeg on 2 September 1923: “Says Mine Workers Betrayed
as Fred Dixon had done during his sensational trial for seditious libel in 1920. Yet 
McLachlan allowed his lawyer to defend him. He did not offer himself as a 
witness on his own behalf nor, unlike Howe, did he volunteer to testify for the 
Crown. In McLachlan, like Howe, the defence called no witnesses. If Harrington 
realized that Howe was indeed the model for McLachlan — referring to the 
“coherent line of defence in the course of the trial,” which David Frank considers 
the defence lawyers not to have presented — then he should have perfected the 
analogy by withdrawing from the case and encouraging McLachlan to defend 
himself. If McLachlan, or his lawyers, had read “Dixon’s address to the jury in 
defence of freedom of speech,” which was published by the Winnipeg Defence 
Committee shortly after Dixon’s acquittal in February 1920, they might have seen 
the wisdom of McLachlan’s trying to recreate Dixon’s triumphant emulation of 
Howe. Instead, Harrington persisted in the attempt to achieve for his client what 
McLachlan perhaps could have better achieved for himself.
The advice that Dixon received from Edward James McMurray, “one of 
Winnipeg’s leading criminal lawyers” and solicitor for the eight arrested General 
Strike leaders, was very different from and more astute than the advice which 
McLachlan received from his counsel. Recognizing in Dixon the “tribune” type, 
McMurray had shrewdly “urged him to study the biography of Howe.”43 The 
sedition trials of Joseph Howe and Fred Dixon demonstrated that the best defence 
was self-defence, but Harrington could not have billed the Nova Scotia Workers’ 
Defence Committee for his services as counsel for advising McLachlan to defend 
himself. Fred Dixon successfully replicated Howe, but McLachlan, despite his 
well-deserved reputation as a platform orator, was not given the opportunity to do 
likewise. His lawyer interposed himself to the detriment of the defence. What 
ultimately scuttled Harrington’s attempt to resurrect Howe, the dual personality
— at once the nervous defendant and the brazen defence counsel — was that Howe, 
the politically dangerous sedition trial, had been transformed by 
pre-Confederation political history into triumphalist hypermyth. Dixon, moreover,
by Lewis,” in Manitoba Free Press [Winnipeg] (3 Sept. 1923) at 6. MacEwan (ibid., 117), on the 
authority of Waye and one of McLachlan’s sons, states that McLachlan was dissuaded by the Nova 
Scotia Workers’ Defence Committee (which was footing the bill for McLachlan’s legal expenses) from 
conducting his own defence. David Frank states, on the authority of the accused’s solicitor and junior 
counsel, J -A. Walker, “that McLachlan did not speak in court because he did not want to”: supra note
3 at 219.
43McNaught, supra note 2 at 166; Bumsted, supra note 9 at 102. McMurray, who in 1921 became a 
Liberal MP and afterwards solicitor-general in the first King ministry, was doubtless influenced by the 
fact that Russell and all but one of the Winnipeg Seven — only three of whom were represented by 
counsel — were convicted of seditious conspiracy. (It is worth noting that McMurray’s immediate 
predecessor as federal solicitor-general was the Cape Breton Liberal MP, Daniel Duncan MacKenzie 
K.C., who was appointed to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in April 1923 and sat for the 
McLachlan appeal. Previous to his appointment to the bench, according to Woodsworth, MacKenzie 
was “the local solicitor for the Nova Scotia Steel [and Coal] Company, at North Sydney, and was very 
closely in touch with Besco”: supra note 23 at 65.)
would only have been relevant had McLachlan been defending himself. 
McLachlan had no choice but to acquiesce in the losing strategy devised by 
counsel whom the Workers Defence Committee had unwisely retained on his 
behalf. In any case, those in power in Nova Scotia were not about to concede that 
there had ever been a trial for sedition in the province — certainly not Howe’s. 
The wisdom of hindsight not only made his acquittal look inevitable but led to the 
reductio ad absurdum that Howe, the tribune, “the voice of Nova Scotia,” could 
not have been subjected to a state trial — a fate reserved in the popular 
imagination for rebels and traitors like Upper Canada’s William Lyon Mackenzie.
In preparing his defence of McLachlan, Harrington, like Dixon, availed himself 
of The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe, a new and complete edition 
of which had been produced in 1909 in a commendably bipartisan manner. The 
publisher was the Halifax Chronicle, the Liberal Party organ founded in 1844 and 
once edited by Joseph Howe, while the reviser was the prominent Conservative 
lawyer and municipal politician, Joseph Andrew Chisholm K.C. Chisholm, who in 
1916 acceded to a puisne judgeship, played a significant collateral role in the 
proceedings against McLachlan.44 In June 1923, he presided at the criminal 
assizes in Sydney, when, according to Attorney-General O’Hearn, “in the 
neighbourhood of twenty-odd bills of indictment against strikers for their criminal 
activities in February 1923, were thrown out” by the grand jury for lack of 
witnesses willing to testify.45 Chisholm was also, according to J.S. Woodsworth, 
one of only two of seven judges of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia who had 
had no “known relations” with Besco or its constituent operating companies.46 
Though Chisholm was not the trial judge for McLachlan, his decision in chambers 
to grant habeas corpus and then bail in favour of McLachlan and Livingstone, both 
of whom were denied bail by the stipendiary magistrate who committed them for
44A brother-in-law of the late Prime Minister Sir John S.D. Thompson, former law partner of Prime 
Minister Sir Robert Borden and twice-failed federal Conservative candidate, Chisholm was nothing 
if not well-connected. He was also well-known as a “labour conciliator”: MacEwan, supra note 4 at 
50. In 1917 and 1918, Justice Chisholm chaired two federal royal commissions inquiring into industrial 
relations in the coalmining and steelmaking industries in Nova Scotia, which led to the 
re-establishment of District 26 of the United Mine-Workers of America in 1919.
45House of Assembly Debates, quoted in Halifax Herald, 20 Feb. 1924 at 5. Here the Attorney-General 
betrayed the real reason for transporting McLachlan and Livingstone to Halifax. The Crown 
anticipated — probably rightly — that any indictments preferred against them in Cape Breton would 
not be returned by the grand jury.
46Supra note 23 at 65. The other was Russell J., the senior puisne, who in December 1921 granted 
the union’s application for an interim injunction to prevent Besco’s unilaterally imposing a wage cut. 
The corporation appealed against the injunction, and it was lifted: Dominion Coal Company Limited 
et al. v. District 26, UMWA et al. (1922), 55 N.S.R. 121 (N.S.S.C. in Banco), per Mellish J. Chisholm 
was one of the three judges sitting for the appeal. Counsel for the respondents were LA. Forsyth and 
J A. Walken supra note 21; solicitors for the appellants were Mellish’s former law firm.
trial, was upheld by the Supreme Court in Banco against an appeal by the 
Crown.47
Harrington, for his part, must have read at least the second chapter of the 
660-page-tome edited by Justice Chisholm fourteen years earlier, but he was living 
too far in the mythological past of 1835. The mere fact that the first trial for 
sedition in Nova Scotia since Howe’s was once again taking place in Halifax did 
not mean that the rules va. Howe applied. McLachlan, in view of the recent verdict 
in Dixon, and perhaps confident enough of acquittal, chose neither to defend 
himself, as both Howe and Dixon had done, nor to testify in his own defence.4* 
Harrington supposed that McLachlan would be acquitted because Howe was, and 
there had not been any prosecutions for seditious libel in the interim. The Halifax 
bar of 1835 thought that Howe would be convicted because William Wilkie was, 
and there had not been any prosecutions for seditious libel in the interim. The 
operative factor was not what had changed in Nova Scotia between 1835 and 1923. 
What mattered were the changes in Canada between 1919 and 1923. By the latter 
date, sedition law was being used systematically against working-class radicals in 
general and strike leaders in particular, regardless of their lack of socialist 
credentials — a tendency strikingly illustrated by the prosecution of Fred Dixon 
MLA. Not only had new repressive state security laws been introduced, but also 
the state’s determination to repress working-class radicalism had been renewed 
since 1919 and the range of potential uses of existing sedition law accordingly 
broadened.
If the significance of Howe for McLachlan relates more to the forensic use of 
history than to the forensic use of law, then McLachlan is an object lesson in the 
failure of legal history as legal argument. It is not a question of the uses or 
sources of law, however, because Howe, as a jury trial resulting in an acquittal did 
not form a legal precedent. Howe in relation to McLachlan concerns the historical 
uses of law versus the juridical uses of history, and in either respect depends upon 
a mutually agreed, authoritative and analytically sound reconstruction of the 
leading case. When the Crown denied the existence of any previous trials for 
sedition in Nova Scotia, the defence attempted unsuccessfully to adduce Howe as 
a precedent. This move led to comparisons and contrasts being drawn without the 
benefit of a proper contextual analysis of the uses and instrumental applications 
of case-law. A proper analysis depends on knowing how the law, both substantive
47R. v. Mitchell, ex parte McLachlan (1923), 56 N.S.R. 380 (N.S.S.C. in Banco). Chisholm also
concurred in the dismissal of the appeal against McLachlan’s conviction, and spoke for the court in 
the bizarre decision to allow the ultra vires application for leave to appeal the disallowance to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council — which it was beyond the court’s power to grant and which 
was really a constitutional reference on the legality of per saltum criminal appeals.
4*The evidence on this point, which depends heavily on oral tradition, is ambiguous; a final 
determination will have to await publication of David Frank’s biography of McLachlan.
and procedural, affected the institution and the resolution of legal proceedings, 
and must avoid not only the lawyer’s fallacy of misconstruction, but also the 
historian’s fallacy of “presentism”. Attempts by historians to link McLachlan to 
Howe have thus far proved no more successful than Harrington’s attempt to do so 
during the trial; however, the reason for this failure is more historical than legal.
The failure of the McLachlan trial defence is attributable not to his lawyer’s 
ignorance of the law, contemporary or historical, but to the prevailing abuse and 
mythification of legal history. It proved impossible for Harrington to displace the 
Howe libel trial myth in favour of the Howe sedition trial precedent; the 
mythology was too solidly entrenched for deconstruction or demythologization to 
be achieved during the course of the trial by counsel for the defence. McLachlan’s 
lawyer, while trying to exploit the Howe sedition trial in the interests of his client, 
found himself enchained by the Howe libel trial myth. Even before McLachlan, 
it was too traumatic to contemplate the possibility that Howe had been tried for 
sedition, which, in the collective consciousness of government and people alike, lay 
much closer to treason than to libel.
Clearly a line of defence which did not result in a verdict of not guilty was “an 
ineffectual one”; however, to criticize it as incoherent, as David Frank does, is ex 
post facto rationalization. Just as scholars of Howe have disposed of some 
archetypal myths — such as that the verdict established freedom of the press — 
only to replace them with others, so students of McLachlan fail to recognize that 
one of the lessons of that case is that criminal law and criminal justice history are 
not necessarily combinable in the context of legal proceedings. Political trials, 
however significant they may be in other respects, are not necessarily significant 
sources of law. Frank, for example, argues that counsel for the defence in 
McLachlan “probably unreasonably, accepted the argument that truth was no 
defence in a case of seditious libel.”49 Harrington’s acceptance of what had long 
been a settled principle of the common law can hardly be considered unreasonable 
for a lawyer pleading in a criminal court. Moreover, Harrington’s failure to 
recognize that one of the lessons of Howe was that the restriction on truth as a 
defence “could be easily evaded in the process of clarifying the defendant’s 
intentions”50 is fully consistent with his argument on appeal that seditious libel 
law was unaffected by the passage of The Libel Act 1792. There the jury’s right 
to “find” intention as a matter of fact was explicitly affirmed. The problem with 
Harrington’s defence was not incoherence but error of law. The Libel Act 1792
Frank, supra note 3 at 221. “If words spoken or published are seditious, it is no defence that they
are true, and evidence to prove their truth is inadmissible”: Halsbury, supra note 29 at 79, para. 91; 
cf. King, supra note 31 at xxiv [Addenda]. It was up to the jury to determine not only whether the 
accused was responsible for publishing the alleged libel, but also whether the publication was a libel 
and, if so, whether the legal or true innuendo evidenced seditious intention.
was the very statute which enabled Howe to evade this common law restriction on 
defence pleading in the course of clarifying his innocent intentions.
As John Mellor correctly states, Harrington “had based his whole case on the 
famous Joseph Howe and his acquittal on a similar charge of seditious libel.”51 
Harrington either did not understand or failed to elucidate the legal justification 
for Howe’s acquittal. He not only misunderstood the implications of The Libel Act 
1792 for sedition law, but also mistook the legal heart of Howe’s defence. 
Harrington nevertheless believed that he could defend McLachlan in the same 
manner and with the same success as Howe had defended himself. Despite the 
fact that McLachlan was not defending himself, and that Howe had called no 
witnesses, there seemed to Harrington little point in putting the accused in the 
witness-box, to be exposed to a withering, ideologically perverse cross-examination 
by the Attorney-General. “It was generally believed,” according to Mellor’s 
hearsay:
that if Harrington had arranged for defence witnesses to give evidence for 
McLachlan at the trial, he could quite possibly have won an acquittal, but instead, 
Harrington had based his whole defence on drawing an analogy between the 
famous Joseph Howe case, which had ended in acquittal, and the McLachlan case 
with its communist overtones.52
This is an aspect in which McLachlan and Dixon differ; Dixon was a non-socialist, 
while McLachlan was a revolutionary socialist who could scarcely have been 
permitted to speak candidly in his own defence in open court.53 Moreover, to
51Mellor, supra note 5 at 230.
$2Ibid. at 234-5. A similar question was pointedly asked of J.S. Woodsworth by O.D. Skelton (then 
Dean of Arts at Queen’s University), who “wondered why it was that strong statutory declarations [sic: 
affidavits] prepared on behalf of the defendant regarding the disturbances in Sydney had not been 
offered in evidence”: Frank, supra note 3 at 223 n. 42, paraphrasing Skelton to Woodsworth, 28 Mar.
1924. Attorney-General O’Heam — doubtless playing devil’s advocate — asked the same question 
in the House of Assembly in February 1924; he was replying to Cape Breton Labour MLA Forman 
Waye, who narrated the eight (or ten?) affidavits during debate and named the deponents; infra note 
55. The post-trial rhetoric (some of it tongue-in-cheek) obfuscated the procedural axiom — 
well-known to both the Attorney-General and counsel for the defence — that evidence to prove the 
truth of a seditious libel was not admissible. The old maxim, ‘The greater the truth the greater the 
libel,” which did not apply to criminal defamation after The Libel Act 1792, continued to apply to 
sedition. The legal defence to seditious libel, as the acquittals of both Howe and Dixon attest, was 
not proving the truth of statements made in the alleged libel but disproving seditious intention.
^McLachlan had joined the fledgling Workers’ Party of Canada in 1922, while Dixon is dismissed by 
Bryan Palmer as “middle class”: B. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of 
Canadian Labour; 1800-1891, 2nd ed. ^ T o r o n t o :  Butterworths, 1992) at 178. Though Dixon and 
McLachlan were both radicals and strike leaders, Dixon was anti-socialist while McLachlan was a 
revolutionary socialist, or communist. Though the two strike leaders were divided by ideology, 
McLachlan had nevertheless helped to found the Independent Labour Party in Nova Scotia in 1920, 
while Dixon was its leader in Manitoba.
have called witnesses would have broken the magic spell which Harrington was 
trying to weave, for Howe had exemplarily called none.
Harrington, to his credit, knew the historical law relating to the defence. 
While Attorney-General O’Hearn believed that there had been no other trials for 
sedition in Nova Scotia, Harrington saw a unique connection with Howe. There 
had been a few others — Hoffman (1754), Houghton (1777) and Wilkie (1820) — 
all resulting in convictions and all superseded by Howe (1835), which not only 
resulted in a sensational acquittal, but also prescribed a test of seditious libel so 
modern in its exclusiveness that it anticipated Boucher (1950) — the leading 
Canadian case. Wlule the Attorney-General professed ignorance of any other trials 
for sedition in Nova Scotia’s history, his role as Crown prosecuting counsel — 
though long obsolete by the 1920s54 — was fully continuous with that of 
Attorney-General Samuel George William Archibald, who closed for the Crown 
at the trial of Howe. O’Hearn, for his part, not only both opened and closed for 
the Crown at the trial of McLachlan, but also examined most of the twelve Crown 
witnesses. Further repeating history, O’Hearn exercised the law officer’s 
prerogative right of addressing the jury last, a custom which also had fallen into 
disuse. So exceptional was O’Hearn’s tactic that it was made a ground for 
McLachlan’s subsequent unsuccessful appeal from his conviction. O’Hearn’s 
long-dead predecessor, Archibald, had exercised the same prerogative right at a 
time when the law officers still routinely acted in person as Crown prosecutors.
The chief difference between the two Attorneys-General was that Archibald 
(a friend of the Howe family) was extremely reluctant to prosecute Howe on a 
trumped-up charge, while O’Hearn had been purposely brought into the 
government in December 1922 and into the Legislative Assembly by acclamation 
the following month, in order to deal with troublesome “labour covenanters” (per 
J.S. Woodsworth) such as McLachlan. O’Hearn, opening for the Crown, declared 
that seditionists were more dangerous criminals than murderers. However 
intemperate his rhetoric and unsound his grasp of legal history, O’Hearn 
understood more clearly than Harrington that the Criminal Code Amendment Act
54The circumstances of this anachronism are fully explained by J.M. Beck, “The Rise and Fall of the 
Attorney General in Nova Scotia” in J. Yogis, ed., Law in a Colonial Society: The Nova Scotia 
Experience : Dalhousie /  Berkeley Lectures on Legal History (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) 125 at 136-7. 
For further information concerning O’Heam’s brief tenure as Attorney-General, Dec. 1922 -  July
1925, see J. Doull, Sketches of Attorney Generals [sic] of Nova Scotia 1750—1926 (Halifax: the author, 
1964) at 121-3. John Doull, a contemporary of O’Heam’s and himself Attorney-General in the 
Conservative government of Premier G.S. Harrington (1930-3), wrote, “An Attorney General had not 
appeared in a criminal court for some twenty years, but O’Heam conducted prosecutions in important 
cases, not only in Halifax but in other counties [e.g., Cape Breton]. He had some outstanding 
successes — for example, he had James McLaughlin [s/c] convicted of sedition — though I doubt 
whether McLaughlin, who was head [hc] of the Union, was saying any worse things than other 
opponents of corporations.”
1919 had reverted the role of juries and the rights of those accused of seditious 
libel to a time before the passage of The Libel Act 1792, when jury verdicts in 
seditious libel trials were not “according to conscience” but practically directed by 
the judge. “No attempt has ever been made by the prisoner’s counsel,” declaimed 
O’Hearn after the McLachlan appeal had been disallowed, “to show that 
McLachlan was not guilty of the offense of seditious libel, or that he was entitled 
to any consideration. The appeals in his interest have all been  ^on 
technicalities.”55 Even though truth was no defence to a charge of seditious libel
— there was no plea of justification or exemption from criminal liability as in 
defamatory libel — the Crown took pains to prove, through the testimony of 
witnesses, not only that McLachlan was legally responsible for publication, but also 
that the statements which McLachlan had made in the alleged seditious libel were 
untrue. Thus false defamation was the basis on which the Crown attempted to 
prove seditious intention.
Harrington’s failure to penetrate the legal heart of Howe’s defence and realize 
its promise for McLachlan makes one wonder whether Howe was not the better, 
or at least the better-prepared lawyer. Though Howe usefully demonstrates the 
counter-hegemonic uses and propaganda benefits of an unsuccessful show trial, 
this leading case on sedition has been viewed neither as part of the common law 
nor as integral to the legal history of Nova Scotia. Howe was undoubtedly a “great 
trial”, yet somehow it is irrelevant to criminal justice history and state security law. 
This admittedly political trial has been almost exclusively subjected to the 
discipline of political and politico-biographical analysis and so belongs fully neither 
to law nor to legal history.56 On those rare occasions when legal analysis was 
undertaken, it was desultory and wrong-headed in the extreme. Even Chief Justice 
Chisholm, who contributed to the Canadian Bar Review a centenary memento of
55[Halifax] Morning Chronicle (20 Feb. 1924) at 1. O’Heam’s retrospective reappraisal of McLachlan 
occurred in connection with his rejoinder to Forman Waye, chief whip of the Farmer-Labour 
opposition in the Assembly and secretary of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin 
Workers of America. At the legislative session which began in February 1924 Waye moved an 
amendment to the address in reply to the speech from the throne, calling for the “revocation of 
Besco’s charter” (Besco’s “charter” was federal, not provincial). Needless to say the motion was 
defeated, but the debate received extensive coverage in the Halifax press, Hansard being suspended 
at the time: Halifax Herald and Morning Chronicle, 19 and 20 Feb. 1924. (For the impact of ‘Forman’s 
filibuster’ -  which made its perpetrator famous -  on working-class consciousness in industrial Cape 
Breton, see Dawn Fraser, ‘To Forman Waye” supra note 12 at 46-8.)
56see, for example, J.M. Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia: Volume One: Nicholson-Fielding 1710-1896 
(Tantallon N.S.: Four East Publications, 1985) at 109: Howe “faced a Supreme Court jury charged 
with criminal libel in what was to be the most celebrated of all Nova Scotian trials. The law was 
completely against him.” Such statements mask ignorance of the law, which is no excuse for bad 
history. If the law had been completely against Howe, then he could scarcely have defended himself 
with such forensic brilliance as to procure an acquittal on legal grounds.
Howet achieved little more than unnecessary confusion between sedition and 
defamation. The agenda of the political rehabilitation of Howe, that lapsed 
anti-confederate, which Chisholm had been assiduously cultivating since 1909, 
triumphed, while a contextual analysis of the legal meaning of 1835 was consigned 
to the rubbish-bin of history. Chisholm’s article, which, despite both factual and 
legal errors continues to be cited deferentially, leaves one with the suspicion that 
his innocuous statements about Howe were delimited and conditioned by his 
too-intimate personal knowledge of McLachlan. Chisholm went in fear of the 
obvious parallel being drawn between the two tribunes.
The wisdom of hindsight enables post -McLachlan students of Howe to 
recognize that Harrington, however grossly he miscalculated the effectiveness of 
the argument from historical law as a defence to sedition, was justified in adducing 
Howe as a precedent. A question remains, however, as to whether the major 
premise of Harrington’s syllogism was sound. No one would dispute that analogy 
is a species of forensic argument; yet if the offence for which Howe was tried was 
seditious libel, then the conclusion — that McLachlan ought likewise to have been 
acquitted — does not necessarily follow. If the Howe libel trial myth had been 
successfully appropriated by the defence for legal purposes, as it was by the 
Conservatives for political purposes, then the Crown in 1923 could not have 
conceded without loss of face that Howe was unsuccessfully prosecuted for sedition 
in 1835. The credibility of the defence turned on whether Howe was acquitted of 
sedition or defamation.
Just as McLachlan is not referred to as a libel trial, so Howe is not referred 
to as a sedition trial — except by McLachlanites. There is more to this optical 
illusion than the interposition of the Criminal Code 1892, which codified security 
law while at the same time discreetly omitting to define sedition. Under the 
common law, seditious libel was always part of sedition, not defamation. 
Moreover, if seditious intention had been positively defined, the 1919 repeal of 
section 133, which defined seditious intention negatively, would have been less 
endangering to the fundamental, “ante-legal” freedoms of thought and expression, 
peaceful assembly and association. (All were at stake in the as yet unrealized legal 
right of employees to organize.) Between 1919 and 1930, when section 133 was 
restored, a new seditious offence might have been created every time a case was 
successfully prosecuted and upheld on appeal. Existing judicial precedents did not
JA. Chisholm, “The King v. Joseph Howe: Prosecution for Libel” (1935) 13 Can. Bar Rev. 584. This 
article was cited by Frank (supra note 3 at 221 n. 35), who also cites J.M. Beck’s influential study, ‘“A 
Fool for a Client’: The Trial of Joseph Howe” in PA. Buckner and D. Frank, eds., The Acadiensis 
Reader: Volume One = Atlantic Canada Before Confederation, 2nd ed. (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press,
1990) at 243. Beck’s article, substantially unaltered, forms Chapter 9 of the firet volume of his 
biography of Howe: supra note 32 at 129. See also B. Cahill, “R. v. Howe for Seditious Libel (1835): 
A Tale of Twelve Magistrates” in F.M. Greenwood and B. Wright, eds., Canadian State Trials Series, 
Volume One: The Early Period, 1608-1837 [forthcoming 1996].
deter activist judges from filling statutory lacunae with oppressive new case-law 
which enlarged the scope of seditious offences. This is clear from Judge J.T. 
Metcalfe’s conduct in the sedition trials of Russell and the Winnipeg Seven, which 
greatly enlarged the scope of seditious conspiracy. After the repeal of section 133, 
in which seditious intention was defined, albeit negatively, bona fide intentions 
were no longer exempt from seditiousness. The most dangerous consequence of 
this legislation was that it left the definition of seditious intention entirely in the 
hands of judges, such as Metcalfe in Manitoba and Mellish in Nova Scotia. Each 
relied on English procedural writers, such as Archbold, to invent substantive 
sedition law, when they could not find what they were looking for in English or 
Canadian case law.58
Just as the legal argument from analogy failed to obtain an acquittal for 
McLachlan, so the argument from legal history has failed to obtain recognition of 
McLachlan as a case which merits judicial reconsideration. As recently as 1990, 
the authors of an essay on the historiography and sources for the study of Russell 
could claim that “[t]he legal history of the Winnipeg General Strike trials has yet 
to be written.”59 The same may be said for the legal history of working-class
his charge Justice Mellish committed the faux pas of misdirecting the jury that section 133, 
repealed four years since, was still in force. Though afterwards made a ground of appeal by the 
defence, this was rejected by the appeal court for the preposterous reason that the section was 
declaratory of the common law and its repeal “could not possibly prejudicially affect the accused”: 
(1924), 56 N.S.R. 413 at 425 (N.S.S.C. In Banco), per Harris CJ. If the “Exception” had not 
ameliorated the rigours of the common law and qualified its application, however, then there would 
have been no reason to repeal section 133 in the first place.
The source of Mellish’s definition of sedition -  the same offered by Metcalfe in Russell -  was 
Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence, & Practice in Criminal Cases, 25th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1918) at 1070; Archbold was — and is — the definitive guide to criminal procedure in the English 
Crown Court. For Metcalfe, see Bumsted, supra note 9 at 117. It is perhaps odd that Canadian 
judges would not have cited an authoritative Canadian text, such as King on Criminal Libel (supra 
note 31), but King was an academic lawyer liberal by comparison. It is odder still that they did not 
cite the nearly contemporaneous Canadian judicial definition of sedition provided in R. v. Bambndge 
(1917) 28 C.C.C 444 at 445 (Ont. S.C), per Riddell J. With these authorities may be contrasted the 
extreme position taken by Attorney-General O’Heam, who contended that at common law seditious 
libel was tantamount to a felony: R. v. Mitchell, ex parte McLachlan (1923), 56 N.S.R. 380 (N.S.S.C. 
in Banco).
59K  Kehler and A. Esau, comp., Famous Manitoba Trials: The Winnipeg General Strike Trials - 
Research Source (Winnipeg: Legal Research Institute, 1990) at 1; [author’s italics]. Exceptions to the 
general rule are L. Katz, “Some Legal Consequences of the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919” (1970)
4 Man LJ 39; P.R. Lederman, “Sedition in Winnipeg: An Examination of the Trials for Seditious 
Conspiracy Arising from the General Strike of 1919” (1976) 3 Queen’s LJ. 3; and D.H. Brown, “The 
Craftsmanship of Bias: Sedition and the Winnipeg Strike Trial 1919” (1984) 14 Man. LJ. 1, which 
deals exclusively with Russell but places it within its proper historical context of the development of 
sedition law in England and Canada. According to Lederman (supra, at 18 and n. 47), in “assessing 
the justifiability of these convictions [for seditious conspiracy], it may be helpful to compare them with 
other trials involving charges of sedition, held before and after the events in Winnipeg. There are 
several cases in which alleged communists were charged with sedition” — one such being McLachlan.
radicalism in Nova Scotia. If one is to take seriously David Frank’s claim that 
McLachlan has “intrinsic interest as one of the more dramatic events in Canadian 
labour history in the 1920s,” then “the significance of historical context in the 
study of legal questions” posed by McLachlan is underlined by Howe and Dixon, 
especially the latter. Unlike J.S. Woodsworth, “who was charged with seditious 
libel during the Winnipeg General Strike in 1 9 1 9 , Fred Dixon was not only 
charged but also tried (cf. Howe, McLachlan) and acquitted (cf. Howe). The trial 
of J.B. McLachlan on charges of seditious libel did not begin to receive rigorous 
academic scrutiny until sixty years after it took place, while comparisons and 
contrasts between Dixon and McLachlan, which were less than four years apart, 
have yet to receive serious study at all.
Strictly speaking, Howe and Dixon (unlike Russell) cannot help to delineate the 
legal context of McLachlan because, as acquittals rather than appeals from 
convictions, they established no new principle of law and were not officially 
reported. Yet the legal context also has an historical dimension. Though as “an 
episode in the history of Canadian law,” McLachlan “clearly demonstrates the very 
broad applications of a loosely defined offence such as sedition,”61 so too did 
every sedition trial over the two centuries separating Hoffman62 in early 1750s 
Nova Scotia from Boucher in early 1950s Quebec. Despite the Criminal Code 
Amendment Act 1919, Dixon and McLachlan, like Howe before them, were 
charged with the old, pre-Coûte common law misdemeanour of seditious libel, to 
which the repeal of the exemptive section 133 gave sharper teeth. Both the law 
and its uses had changed, but it was the new uses for old law which ultimately 
mattered.
To paraphrase David Frank, the historiography of McLachlan reminds us that 
there is still a need for greater attention to the establishment of juridical context 
in studying Canadian sedition trials and the development of judicial doctrinism 
through case-law. The historical basis for the comparison between Howe and 
McLachlan is that sedition law had been used not only to curtail “fundamental 
freedoms,” such as freedom of the press, but also to contest the legality of 
working-class activism and political radicalism. Unfortunately, the attempt to use 
Howe as pertinent case law was defeated by the popular misconception of the case 
as one of criminal defamation rather than sedition. In Howe’s case, a meaningless 
scholastic distinction remains between sedition and libel, though there was no 
doubt in the minds of contemporaries that Howe, like Wilkie fifteen years before 
and McLachlan eighty-eight years after, “was above all a political trial.”63
^rank, supra note 3 at 208-9.
61Ibid.
**R. v. Hoffman (1754), N.S. Gen. Ct. — for seditious conspiracy.
®Frank, supra note 3 at 222.
Counsel for McLachlan attempted unsuccessfully to raise the construction and 
pertinence of Howe as a legal issue, but instead discovered that its value as a 
precedent was really neither historical nor legal, and that its “politically correct” 
interpretation had the status of received law.
The most enduring mystery of the trial of J.B. McLachlan, more so even than 
the elected silence of the accused, is why Harrington based his defence on the 
historic precedent of Howe, while altogether ignoring the role which the latter had 
played in Dixon. The Crown had closely studied — and argued — the Russell 
seditious conspiracy precedent, while the defence overlooked the very material 
Dixon seditious libel precedent. This sin of omission has been carried over into 
the historiography of McLachlan, from which Dixon is also conspicuously absent. 
Harrington failed to integrate Howe successfully into his defence of McLachlan 
because he did not use Howe to the same effect as did Dixon. But Harrington was 
not on trial; he was not defending himself nor was he advising McLachlan to do 
so. As counsel for the accused, he would speak to the materiality of Howe rather 
than letting Howe speak for himself through McLachlan. The success of the 
Howe defence in Dixon proved that the same elements could be recombined to 
cause history to repeat itself. Neither Dixon nor McLachlan needed a lawyer, 
while Howe, who thought he needed one, tried desperately but in vain to find one. 
Self-representation, which was accidental but fortuitous in Howe’s case — 
calculated in Dixon’s — was probably the best course for McLachlan to have 
followed.
One may dissent from Paul MacEwan’s (and David Frank’s?) opinion of 
Harrington as a self-serving, opportunistic attorney who “conducted an exceedingly 
inept defence.”64 These scholars prefer to blame McLachlan’s conviction on the 
lawyer who tried to defend him rather than on the judge who allegedly misdirected 
the jury, or the panel who found him guilty. In so doing they disserve the 
working-class history of resistance by failing to explain correctly the legal defence 
to seditious libel. Legal history is more context and perspective than narrative 
content, and post-trial analysis of McLachlan leads one to the conclusion that the 
verdict was more O’Hearn’s triumph than Harrington’s defeat. The better 
advocate won.
MacEwan, like all other scholars of the trial of J.B. McLachlan, maintains a 
deafening silence about the trial of Fred Dixon, which occurred less than four 
years earlier. Whatever the nature of the relationship between the two, it remains 
curious that no discussion of the trial of J.B. McLachlan for seditious libel in 1923 
adverts to the trial of Fred Dixon for seditious libel in 1920. This lacuna in 
comparative legal history may be attributed to the embarrassment of ideological 
impurity. McLachlan was deprived of the heroic example of Dixon simply because
McLachlan was a revolutionary socialist, while Dixon remained an independent 
labourite and harsh critic of socialism in all its forms — including social 
democracy. What McLachlan’s historians do not realize, any more than his 
defenders of seventy years ago, is that Dixon was the precedent, legal and 
historical, which would have made the Howe defence sustainable. It would have 
been better had McLachlan emulated Dixon’s example — and gone down fighting 
regardless — than for him to have a nostalgic Tory for a lawyer caricaturing 
Howe’s historic defence of himself.
Appendix 1: Text of J.B. McLachlan’s Alleged Seditious Libel
Official Letter DISTRICT NO. 26,
United Mine Workers of America.
Glace Bay, N. S.
July 4th, 1923.
To Officers & Members of Local Unions,
Brothers:-
This Office has been informed that all [New] Waterford, Sydney Mines and 
Glace Bay Sub-Districts are out on strike this morning as a protest against the 
importation of Provincial Police and Federal troops into Sydney to intimidate the 
Steel Workers into continuing work at 32¢, per hour.
On Sunday night last [1 July] these Provincial Police in the most brutal manner 
rode down the people at Whitney Pier [within the City of Sydney] who were on the 
street, most of whom were coming from church. Neither age, sex nor physical 
disabilities was proof against these brutes. One old woman over seventy years of 
age was beaten into insensibility and may die. A boy nine years old was trampled 
under the horses’ feet and had his breast bones crushed in. One woman beaten 
over the head with a police club gave premiture [s/c] birth to a child. The child 
is dead and the mother’s life despared [sic] of. Men and women were beaten up 
in side their own homes.
Against these brutes, the miners are on strike. The Government of Nova 
Scotia is the guilty and responsible party for this crime. No miner or mine worker 
can remain at work while this Government turns Sydney into a jungle, to do so is 
to sink your manhood and allow [Liberal Premier Ernest Howard] Armstrong and 
his miserable bunch of grafting politicians to trample your last shred of freedom 
into the mud. Call a meeting of your Local at once and decide to spread the fight 
against Armstrong to every coal mine in Nova Scotia. Act at once -  tomorrow 
may be too late.
Fraternally yours,
[Signed] J. B. McLachlan Sec’y 
Dist. 26.
Source: stencil-plate copy, criminal case file (infra Appendix 2)
Appendix 2: Note on the Disposition of Archival Court Records
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia criminal case file, R. v. McLachlan, as now 
constituted, is a “fat file” containing thirty-three items, some of which are 
multipart: RG 39 *C (HX) box 706 file B-164, Public Archives of Nova Scotia 
[PANS]. Its contents include not only the transcripts of the preliminary hearing 
and the trial, but also both of the exhibits admitted into evidence at the trial, as 
well as records relating to the habeas corpus application, the disallowed appeal and 
the application for leave to reappeal from the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in 
Banco to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council — all three of which 
proceedings were reported in 56 N.S.R. The top copy of the criminal appeal book 
(76 p.) is not extant, having probably disappeared in the course of preparing and 
publishing the official report of McLachlan v. R. : (1923) 56 N.S.R. 413 (S.C. in 
Banco). The carbon copy belonging to Russell J — one of the five justices of the 
Supreme Court in Banco “sitting as a criminal court of appeal” — now forms part 
of the McLachlan case file in the Remissions Branch record series in the 
Department of Justice fonds at NA: RG 13 C2 box 1233 file 25777, National 
Archives of Canada. (NB This document, which includes the “stenographic report 
of the trial” quoted verbatim by Harris CJ, delivering the judgment of the appeal 
court on 8 January 1924, was consulted by both David Frank and John Mellor.)
